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O P I N I O N* 
   
 
RENDELL, Circuit Judge:  
 Kamal Jamai petitions for review of the decision of the Board of Immigration 
Appeals (“BIA”) reversing the ruling of the Immigration Judge (“IJ”) that Jamai was 
entitled to relief from removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). Because 
the BIA did not adequately explain the reasoning underlying its decision, we are unable 
to meaningfully review that decision. We will therefore vacate the BIA’s order and 
remand for further proceedings. 
I.  Background 
                                              
 * This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
3 
 
 Jamai entered the United States on a non-immigrant B-2 visa in 1999 when he was 
16 years old. In 2002, he married a United States citizen, with whom he fathered a child 
in April 2009. Because of his marriage to a United States citizen, Jamai’s application for 
an adjustment of his immigration status to that of a Lawful Permanent Resident was 
granted in October 2009. 
 Jamai has been a heroin addict since 2004. To fund his addiction, Jamai has taken 
to thievery, for which he has been arrested no fewer than fourteen times in eight years. 
These arrests led to several convictions, prompting the Department of Homeland Security 
to charge Jamai with removability pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(i)-(iii) based on 
the nature of his convictions. Jamai does not contest that his criminal convictions are of 
the type that would require his removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1227, but seeks to have his 
removal deferred under the CAT, see generally 8 C.F.R. § 1208.17. Jamai contends that 
his addiction would almost certainly lead him to relapse into using heroin, which would 
lead to his arrest and torture by law enforcement in Morocco.  
 In his hearing before the IJ, Jamai testified that he is addicted to heroin, that he has 
only refrained from using heroin when in custody, that he has relapsed each time he has 
been released from custody, that stress triggers his relapses, and that removal to Morocco 
would cause him considerable stress. Documentary evidence was admitted that describes 
heroin addiction and relapse, indicating that relapse is stress-induced and that addiction 
chemically alters the brain. Dr. Abdeslam Maghraoui, a professor at Duke University, 
testified on Jamai’s behalf as an expert on Moroccan political institutions. Dr. Maghraoui 
testified that drug treatment resources in Morocco are limited and that drug treatment is 
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among the lowest priorities of the Moroccan government. Dr. Maghraoui testified that if 
Jamai relapsed into his heroin use he would most likely be arrested by authorities in 
Morocco, whether for purchasing an illegal substance (heroin) or for stealing to purchase 
heroin. That Jamai has lived his entire adult life in the United States would make him a 
target for police attention, Dr. Maghraoui testified, because he would be an “outsider” in 
Moroccan society. Finally, Dr. Maghraoui testified that Moroccan authorities would more 
likely than not torture Jamai, as the use of torture to secure confessions for unsolved 
crimes (even those for which the tortured individual is not a suspect) is prevalent in 
Morocco. Moreover, Jamai’s “Americanized” demeanor and attitude concerning 
individual rights make it likely that the police in Morocco would perceive Jamai as 
disrespectful and would mistreat him. See App. 13-14. Jamai introduced documentary 
evidence supporting Dr. Maghraoui’s opinion testimony, particularly the testimony that 
drug treatment is largely unavailable in Morocco and that Moroccan authorities often 
resort to torture to obtain forced confessions.  
 The IJ credited Jamai’s and Dr. Maghraoui’s testimony and ruled in favor of 
Jamai, concluding that Jamai had demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that 
he would be tortured if removed to Morocco.1 In so concluding, the IJ found each of the 
following links in a hypothetical chain of events more likely than not to occur: (1) Jamai 
is a heroin addict; (2) Jamai will relapse if removed to Morocco; (3) Jamai will not seek 
or receive adequate treatment for his addiction in Morocco; (4) as a result of his addiction 
                                              




and lack of adequate treatment, Jamai will be arrested by Moroccan authorities; and (5) 
Jamai will be subjected to torture by the police. 
 The BIA reversed the decision of the IJ, finding “clear error in the [IJ’s] finding 
that it is more likely than not that [Jamai] will be tortured if removed to Morocco because 
it is based on a string of suppositions which are unproven on this record.” App. 4. The 
BIA’s reasoning for its conclusion was explained in a single paragraph: 
[T]he [IJ] determined, without adequate documentary or qualified expert 
witness evidence on the issue, that it is more likely than not that [Jamai] 
will relapse and use heroin in Morocco. While there is some evidence in the 
record concerning the frequent relapse of heroin addicts, the record lacks 
testimony from a qualified expert or documentation assessing the likelihood 
that a person in [Jamai’s] specific circumstances is likely to relapse. [Jamai] 
has been able to refrain from using heroin for more than 2 years and claims 
to fear severe consequences should he resume its use in Morocco. 
Furthermore, the [IJ] assumed that [Jamai] would not seek out any 
treatment that may be available to prevent such a relapse. [Jamai’s] 
evidence also does not prove each step in the hypothetical chain concerning 
whether the authorities would become aware of any future heroin use and 
arrest him, that he would then refuse to confess his guilt, and that he thus 
would be tortured for the purpose of procuring his confession.  
App. 4-5 (citations and footnote omitted).  
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1) to review the BIA’s final order 
of removal. We review legal determinations by the BIA de novo, although we defer to the 
BIA’s reasonable interpretations of the law. See Gomez–Zuluaga v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 
527 F.3d 330, 339 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, 
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 838 (1984)). We review factual determinations by the BIA for 
substantial evidence. Valdiviezo–Galdamez v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 590 (3d 
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Cir. 2011). To meaningfully review the BIA’s order, however, “we must have some 
insight into its reasoning,” especially when the BIA reverses the IJ’s decision. Toussaint 
v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 455 F.3d 409, 414 (3d Cir. 2006), as amended (Sept. 29, 2006) 
(quoting Awolesi v. Ashcroft, 341 F.3d 227, 232 (3d Cir. 2003)). Although “the BIA is 
not required to write an exegesis on every contention,” id. (quoting Zudeba v. Ashcroft, 
333 F.3d 463, 477 (3d Cir. 2003)), “the BIA should indicate its reasons for discrediting 
certain testimony or documentary evidence.” Id.  
III. Analysis   
 To qualify for withholding of removal under the CAT, Jamai bears the burden of 
“establish[ing] that it is more likely than not that he . . . would be tortured if removed to 
the proposed country of removal.” Kaplun v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 602 F.3d 260, 268 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(2)). There are two distinct parts to the question 
of whether relief under the CAT can be granted: (1) the factual question of what is likely 
to happen to Jamai if removed; and (2) the legal question of whether what is likely to 
happen amounts to the legal definition of torture.2 Id. at 271. In demonstrating that he 
would likely be tortured if removed, Jamai must demonstrate that each link in the 
hypothetical chain of events is more likely than not to occur, as “[i]t is the likelihood of 
all necessary events coming together that must more likely than not lead to torture, and a 
chain of events cannot be more likely than its least likely link.” In Re J.F.F., 23 I. & N. 
                                              
 2 The BIA reversed on the first of these two questions (“what is likely to happen to 
the petitioner if removed?”) and did not address the second (“does what is likely to 
happen amount to the legal definition of torture?”). The second is thus not at issue. 
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Dec. 912, 918 n.4 (AG 2006); accord. Savchuck v. Mukasey, 518 F.3d 119, 123-24 (2d 
Cir. 2008).  
 Here, the BIA rejected the IJ’s findings that Jamai would likely relapse if removed 
to Morocco, leading to his being arrested and tortured by Moroccan authorities. In 
rejecting the IJ’s findings that Jamai was likely to relapse if he returned to Morocco, the 
BIA stated that the record “lacks testimony from a qualified expert or documentation 
assessing the likelihood that a person in [Jamai’s] specific circumstances is likely to 
relapse.” App. 4-5. But “[t]he likelihood [of] (an inferential fact) may be established 
through . . . testimony of past experience,” Kaplun, 602 F.3d at 269, and the IJ credited 
Jamai’s testimony about his past experience of repeated stress-induced relapses into 
heroin use. The BIA did not discuss this evidence. The BIA did note that Jamai “has been 
able to refrain from using heroin for more than 2 years,” App. 5, but evidence before the 
IJ showed that Jamai had been incarcerated during this two-year period and that, while 
Jamai had a history of having drug-free periods while incarcerated, these were followed 
by relapses upon release from incarceration, see App 10, 18. The BIA did not discuss this 
evidence. 
 Similarly sparse was the BIA’s explanation for rejecting the IJ’s finding that the 
other links in the causal chain were more probable than not. The BIA explained that “the 
[IJ] assumed that [Jamai] would not seek out any treatment that may be available to 
prevent such a relapse.” App. 5. But the IJ reached that conclusion after considering (a) 
Jamai’s history of not availing himself of treatment; and (b) documentary evidence and 
expert testimony indicating that “there are virtually no available [drug treatment] 
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resources in Morocco.” App. 19. The BIA did not discuss any of this evidence. The BIA 
further asserted that Jamai’s “evidence also does not prove each step in the hypothetical 
chain concerning whether the authorities would become aware of any future heroin use 
and arrest him, that he would then refuse to confess his guilt, and that he thus would be 
tortured for the purpose of procuring his confession.” App. 5. But Dr. Maghraoui testified 
as to each of these steps in the hypothetical chain, and the IJ credited his testimony. We 
do not know whether, or if so, why, the BIA may have rejected this testimony. 
 By failing to address much of the evidence relied upon by the IJ, the BIA 
effectively discredited that evidence without explanation, leaving us unable to 
meaningfully review the BIA’s decision. See Toussaint, 455 F.3d at 414 (“[T]he BIA 
should indicate its reasons for discrediting certain testimony or documentary evidence.”). 
Accordingly, we will remand for a more thorough explication by the BIA.  
IV. Conclusion 
 For the foregoing reasons, Jamai’s petition for review will be granted, the BIA’s 
order will be vacated, and this case will be remanded to the BIA for further consideration 
consistent with this opinion. 
